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1Inference of Signs of Interaction Eects
in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information
Abstract
This paper studies the inference of interaction eects (impacts of players' actions on each
other's payos) in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose an
easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction eects that does not
require parametric specications of players' payos, the distributions of their private signals
or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly invoked assumption
that players' private signals are independent conditional on observed states. The procedure
is valid in (but does not rely on) the presence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating
process (DGP). As a by-product, we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the DGP.
We also show how to extend our arguments to identify signs of interaction eects when private
signals are correlated. We provide Monte Carlo evidence of the test's good performance in
nite samples. We then implement the test using data on radio programming of commercial
breaks in the U.S., and infer stations' incentives to synchronize their commercial breaks. Our
results support the earlier nding by Sweeting (2009) that stations have stronger incentives
to coordinate and air commercials at the same time during rush hours and in smaller markets.
JEL Codes: C01, C72
21 Introduction
Strategic interaction eects occur when a player's action choice aects not only his or her
own payo but also those of other players. In simultaneous discrete games of incomplete
information, each person has a private signal about his or her payo, while the joint distri-
bution of such private signals is common knowledge among all players.1 In a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE), individuals act to maximize their expected payos given their knowledge
of these distributions and the payo structure. Such models have found applications in a
variety of empirical contexts where players are uncertain about their competitors' payos
given their own information. These include, for example, airing commercials at radio sta-
tions (Sweeting (2009)) and peer eects in recommendations by nancial analysts (Bajari,
Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010)).
Earlier works have studied the identication and estimation of these games using a
wide spectrum of restrictions. These include (but are not limited to) the independence of
private signals from observable covariates, parametric specication of relevant distributions
or utility functions, or constraints on the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria. In comparison, we
focus on inference of the signs of interaction eects, which are allowed to be individual-specic
and state-dependent, under a minimal set of nonparametric restrictions on private signals
and payo structures. Our choice of focus is motivated by two considerations. First, signs of
interaction eects alone may have important policy implications. For example, if agents have
an incentive to coordinate on a particular action then an exogenous intervention that induces
a subset of participants to choose a certain action should at the same time also incentivize
1Recent work by Grieco (2010) studies a class of games with exible information structures that also
subsume games with complete information where players know each other's payos for sure. In a similar
spirit, Navarro and Takahashi (2009) suggest a test for the information structure that, among other things,
relies on a degenerate equilibrium selection rule and independence between residuals and observed covariates.
Other papers have also dealt with unobserved heterogeneity across games which is observed by players but
not econometricians (e.g. Sweeting (2009), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Arcidiacono and Miller
(2010), these last two in a dynamic setting).
3other players to act accordingly. Second, while point identication and estimation of the
full structure of such games inevitably hinge on parametric restrictions, inference on signs of
interaction eects can be done under minimal nonparametric restrictions on the structure.
Such inference is valid even in the presence of multiple equilibria and does not invoke any
assumptions on the equilibrium selection mechanism in the data-generating process. This
is particularly notable, since almost all previous work has relied on stringent assumptions
about equilibrium selection or multiplicity to attain identication (e.g., the single-equilibrium
assumption in Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010) and Tang (2010), equilibrium
uniqueness in Seim (2006) or Aradillas-Lopez (2010), the restriction to monotone, threshold-
crossing Bayesian-Nash equilibria of Wan and Xu (2010) or the symmetry of equilibria and
payo functions and parametrization of equilibrium selection mechanism as in Sweeting
(2009)).2
The existence of multiple equilibria in the data can be exploited to infer the signs
of strategic interactions. If players' private signals are independent from each other given
observed covariates, then their chosen actions must be uncorrelated in any single equilibrium.
On the other hand, if multiple equilibria exist in the data, then the joint distribution of
actions observed is a mixture of those implied in each single equilibrium. This leads to
correlations between the players' actions observed from data. We show in Section 3 that
signs of correlations between players' actions are determined by the signs of the strategic
interaction eects. As a by-product, the correlations also allow us to identify the existence
of multiple equilibria in the data (see below). The assumption of conditional independence
of private information is commonly maintained in the literature on estimation and inference
in static games with incomplete information (see, for example, Seim (2006), Aradillas-Lopez
2As indicated in Berry and Tamer (2007), another possibility is to resort to partial identication. Exam-
ples of such a strategy in games of complete information are Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2009),
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Galichon and Henry (2009) and earlier references cited in Berry and Tamer
(2007). Also in games of complete information, Bjorn and Vuong (1984) parameterize the equilibrium selec-
tion mechanism.
4(2010), Berry and Tamer (2007), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010), Bajari, Hahn,
Hong, and Ridder (forthcoming), Brock and Durlauf (2007), Sweeting (2009) and Tang
(2010)).3 The assumption can also be found in the literature on the estimation of dynamic
games with incomplete information.
We also generalize these arguments for identifying the signs of interaction eects to
allow for the possibility that in the data there is only a unique equilibrium for a given state.
The idea relies on the following simple intuition. Suppose that for some player i there exists
a sub-vector of state variables that aect other players' payos or private signals but not
his or her own. Then sign of the correlation between actions chosen by i and others across
dierent realizations of such \excluded" states must be solely determined by others' actions
aect i's payos, provided the private signals are independent given observed states. Such
exclusion restrictions on state variables arise naturally in many applications and have been
used before in similar contexts.
Another contribution of this paper is to introduce a formal test for the presence
of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. Testing for multiple equilibria is of
practical importance in empirical research, because existing estimation methods often rely
on the occurrence of a single equilibrium in the data. The test we propose is a natural
outcome of the logic used in our inference of the signs of interaction eects. An innovation
of our test for multiple equilibria is to use a stepwise multiple testing procedure to infer
whether each individual player has dierent strategies across the multiple equilibria in the
data-generating process. This is particularly interesting for structural estimation of games
involving three or more players, in which a subset of players may stick to the same strategy
across multiple equilibria. Semiparametric methods based on the assumption of a unique
equilibrium can still be applied to consistently estimate payo parameters for those players
3In a subsection, Aradillas-Lopez (2010) suggests an estimation procedure to handle cases in which the
assumption is violated, but relies on the assumption that a single equilibrium is played in the data. Another
exception is Wan and Xu (2010) who nevertheless also require that a unique (monotone) Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium be played in the data.
5who do not switch between strategies in multiple equilibria. Hence, it is useful to infer
the identity of such players from observed distributions of actions. Our test is known to
eectively control the probability of rejecting at least one of the true single null hypotheses.
We also provide identication results that relax the conditional independence of pri-
vate signals. Such an extension relies on econometricians' observation of groups (or clusters)
of games within which players follow strategies prescribed by the same BNE. For example,
a market or household observed over multiple periods or a cluster of games from similar
cultural traits or geographic region could often be justied as one such group. Within a
given group, permuting players across independent games still leads to observations where
the same equilibrium is played. Provided games are independent within groups, private sig-
nals of players across these games will be independent, and permuted versions of the games
would mimic the conditional independence assumption.
Finally, we apply our methodology to investigate radio stations' incentives to coordi-
nate on commercial breaks using the data from Sweeting (2009). Relaxing the parametric
and symmetry assumptions in that paper, we conrm his ndings that incentives to coordi-
nate are stronger during rush hour and in smaller markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present our basic model and empirical character-
ization in the next section. In Section 3, we present the main results on the identication
of the sign of interaction eects. Section 4 outlines general testing procedures for inference.
We generalize our results in section 5. Monte Carlo experiments and an application to joint
retirement are presented in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model and Empirical Context
We consider a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information involving N players.
Each player i chooses an action Di from two alternatives, f1;0g. A vector of states X 2 RK
is common knowledge among all players. A vector of private information (or \types/signals")
6  (i)iN 2 RN is such that i is only observed by player i. Throughout the paper we will
use upper case letters for random variables and lower case for their realized values. We use

R to denote the support of any generic random vector R = (R1;R2), and let FR, FR1jR2
denote respectively the marginal and conditional distributions in the data-generating process
(DGP). Conditional on a given state X = x, private information  is jointly distributed
according to the CDF FjX(jx). The payo for player i from choosing action 1 is U1i(X;i) 
ui(X)+(
P
j6=i Dj)i(X) i, while the return from the other action U0i(X;i) is normalized
to 0. For example, consider a game with two players and a payo structure such that player
i obtains Uai(x)  ~ uai(x) + ~ ai(x)1(j plays a)   ~ ai if she plays a 2 f0;1g. In this case, our
analysis focusses on ui(x)  ~ u1i(x)   ~ u0i(x), i(x)  ~ 1i(x)   ~ 0i(x) and i  ~ 1i   ~ 0i, since
decisions will depend only on the dierences of payos. Intuitively, ui(X) species a base
return from action 1 for player i. Meanwhile i(X) captures interaction eects on i's payo
due to another player j who chooses 1. The return functions (ui;i)N
i=1 and the distribution
of private information FjX are common knowledge among all players. We maintain the
following identifying restrictions on FjX throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 Conditional on any x 2 
X, i is independent of (j)j6=i for all i and has
positive density over RN.
Assumption 1 allows X to be correlated with private information of the players, as is
plausible in empirical applications. This conditional independence restriction is commonly
used in the estimation literature for both static and dynamic games with incomplete infor-
mation. A pure strategy for player i in this Bayesian game is a mapping si : 
X;i ! f0;1g.






1; if ui(X) + i(X)j6=iE[Sj(X;j)jX;i]   i  0
0; otherwise.
Under Assumption 1, E[Sj(X;j)jX = x;i] = E[Sj(X;j)jX = x]  pj(x), and a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (BNE) in pure strategies (given state x) can be characterized by a prole
7of choice probabilities p(x)  [p1(x);:::;pN(x)] such that for all x 2 
X,
pi(x) = FijX=x (ui(x) + i(x)j6=ipj(x)) for all i = 1;:::;N (1)
where pi(x) is player i's probability of choosing action 1 conditional on the state x and FijX
is the marginal distribution of i conditional on X. Let Lx; denote the set of BNE (as
summarized by solutions in p in (1)) for a given x and structure   f(ui;i)i=1;:::;N;FjXg.
The existence of pure-strategy BNE for any given x follows from Brouwer's Fixed Point
Theorem and the continuity of FijX under Assumption 1. In general there may be multiple
BNE, depending on the specications of FjX, ui and i.
The model specication rules out general heterogeneous interaction eects that may
vary with the identities of each pair of competing players (e.g. ij). Nonetheless, we can
extend our inference approach to allow players' payos to be aected by competitors' de-
cisions in general forms that are known to researchers (see discussions in Section 3). This
would be the case, for example, if payos depends on the proportion (instead of the sum) of
agents taking an action, or on the action of at least one other person (but not on the action
of additional agents beyond that) (i.e. fi(x;D i) = maxj6=i(Dj)), or even if it change only
when all competitors take a particular action (i.e. fi(x;D i) = minj6=i(Dj)).
This model diers qualitatively from the social interaction model studied in Brock
and Durlauf (2007) and that in Sweeting (2009) in that it allows for asymmetry in players'
payo functions and equilibria. Thus, even when payos are symmetric, we allow for asym-
metric BNE where the implied choice probabilities could vary across players, and multiple
asymmetric BNE can arise regardless of the signs of interaction eects. This makes the task
of detecting multiple BNE and signs of interaction eects more interesting as well as more
challenging.
We assume econometricians have access to a large cross-section of independent games
between N players. In each game, they observe choices of actions by all players and realized
states x, but do not observe (i)iN or know the form of (ui;i)iN and FjX. Our analysis
posits (i) that the structure ((ui;i)iN and FjX) is xed across all games observed, and (ii)
8that the choice data observed is generated by players following the pure strategies prescribed
by BNE. Econometricians are interested in learning (at least some features of) the structure
(ui;i)iN and FjX from the observable joint distribution of X and (Di)iN.
Suppose the choices observed in the data are known to be generated from a single BNE
in the DGP for all x 2 
X. This may arise because either (a) the solution to (1) is unique,
or (b) the system of equations in (1) admits multiple solutions but the equilibrium selection
in the DGP is degenerate in one of the multiple solutions. Then (1) oers a link between
observable conditional choice patterns and structural elements (ui;i)iN;FjX. Estimation
can then be done under various restrictions on u,  and FjX (see Aradillas-Lopez (2010),
Berry and Tamer (2007), Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010) and Tang (2010) for
more details). We say there are multiple BNE in DGP if there are several solutions to (1)
and the equilibrium selection mechanism in the data is not degenerate at any one of them.
This link between observed choice patterns and structural elements may nonetheless
break down when there are multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. To see this,
let x; be an equilibrium selection mechanism (i.e. a distribution over Lx;) in the data-
generating process that may depend on x and , but is independent from the vector of private
information (i)iN. That  depends on x but not realizations of i captures the idea that
only information commonly known to all players may plausibly aect which equilibrium is
played in the data-generating process (see Myerson (1991), pp.371-2).
To simplify the notation, we drop subscripts  from x; and Lx; in the subsequent
sections when there is no ambiguity. For any x such that Lx is not a singleton, the conditional
choice probability observed in the data is a mixture of the conditional choice probabilities






is the actual marginal probability that i chooses 1 conditional on x observed from data,
and pl  (pl
i)iN is a generic element in the set of possible BNE Lx, with l indexing the
equilibria in Lx and pl
i, the marginal probability for i to choose 1 given x (and the structure
) implied in equilibrium l. While, by denition, the xed point characterization in (1) holds
9for every single BNE pl 2 Lx, it does not necessarily hold for the vector of mixture marginals
p  (p
i)iN observed.
Researchers have taken dierent approaches to deal with the issue of multiple equi-
libria in empirical work. Each of these strategies (which can also be combined) has some
limitations. We are interested in constructing a robust way to test for the existence of mul-
tiple equilibria and to recover the sign of interactions under minimum restrictions on the
model primitives.
3 Identifying Signs of Interaction Eects
3.1 The basic idea
We now show how to detect the presence of multiple BNE in the data-generating process and
identify signs of interaction eects i(x) for any i given any x. The sign reveals the nature
of strategic incentives among players. Compared with earlier works, our sign identication
has several innovations and contributions. First, our test does not invoke any parametric
restrictions on players' preferences or distributions of private information. Second, it allows
the strategic incentives (as captured by the sign of i) to be a function of states x. Third, our
approach is robust to the presence of multiple BNE. In fact, while the existence of multiple
BNE at rst precludes complete identication of the structure, it does help identify the sign
of interaction eects. This possibility is informally outlined, for example, in Manski (1993)
and in Sweeting (2009).4




i(x)  El (j6=iDjjX = x) = j6=ip
l
j(x)
where El denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution of (Di)iN induced in the
4\The prospects for identication may improve if f(;) is non-linear in a manner that generates multiple
social equilibria" (p. 539, Manski (1993)).
10equilibrium pl 2 Lx. Dene sign(a) to be 1 if a > 0,  1 if a < 0 and 0 if a = 0. For any
player i 2 f1;:::;Ng, let ~ 
i (x) denote the conditional expectation of the product Di(j6=iDj)





i(x)dx(pl), where x denotes
the equilibrium-selection mechanism in the DGP. Let p
i(x) be the actual probability that i








x denote the subset of Lx that occurs in the DGP with positive probability
(L+
x  fpl : x(pl) > 0g). Multiple BNE exist in the DGP if L+
x is not a singleton.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. (i) For any given x, multiple BNE exist in
the data-generating process if and only if ~ 
i (x) 6= p
i(x)
i (x) at least for some i; (ii) For all
i and x such that ~ 









i (x)) = sign(i(x)) (2)
Proof of Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, Di must be independent of j6=iDj conditional
on x in every single BNE pl in Lx.
(Suciency of (i)) Suppose there is a unique BNE in the data-generating process. That
is, L+
x is a singleton fplg. Then p
i(x) = pl
i(x), 
i (x) = j6=ipl
j(x) and ~ 
i (x) = pl
i(x)j6=ipl
j(x)
for all i in state x. Hence ~ 
i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x) for all i.
(Necessity of (i)) Suppose L
+
x; is not a singleton in state x. Then there exists at least
some i and pl;pk 2 L+
x such that pl
i 6= pk
i.Also note that for such a player i, i(x) must
necessarily be non-zero. By denition,
i(x)  ~ 



























Suppose i(x) > 0. The equilibrium characterization in (1) implies that there exists a strictly










11single pl in Lx;.5 Thus for x given, (3) can be written as
~ 















where z  pl
i(x) and ~ i;x is a distribution of pl
i(x) induced by the equilibrium selection
mechanism x dened on Lx. Thus (3) takes the simple form of the covariance of a random
variable z and a strictly increasing function of itself:
cov(Z;hi(Z)) = E[(Z   E(Z))(hi(Z)   E(hi(Z)))]
= E[(Z   E(Z))(hi(Z)   hi(E(Z)))] + E[(Z   E(Z))(hi(E(Z))   E(hi(Z)))]
= E[(Z   E(Z))(hi(Z)   hi(E(Z)))]
Because hi is strictly increasing in [0;1] for given x, we have z1 > z2 ) hi(z1) > hi(z2).
Consequently, (z   E(Z))(hi(z)   hi(E(Z))) > 0 for any z 6= E(Z), and the covariance is
strictly positive, provided the distribution ~ i;x is not degenerate on L+




i (x) > 0 if multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process in state x. The case
with i(x) < 0 is proved by symmetric arguments. The proof of (ii) is already included in
the proof of (i) above.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 can be exploited to devise a Wald Test for multiple BNE
under any given x in the DGP. We describe the test and discuss its asymptotic properties in
the appendix. Part (ii) of the proposition suggests the sign of i(x) can be recovered from
observed distributions provided i actively switches between multiple equilibrium strategies
under x in DGP.
In some empirical contexts, players' actions may have heterogeneous impacts on each
others' payos. Our arguments in Proposition 1 can be extended as long as econometricians
know the role of these heterogeneities in strategic interactions. More specically, we allow
U1i(X;i)  ui(X)+i(X)fi(X;D i) i, where fi(X;D i) is a known function summarizing
how individual actions aect interaction eects and i(x) is a baseline eect whose sign is to
be inferred.
5The form of hi may depend on  and x in general. We suppress this dependence for notational ease.
12For a xed x, any function fi(x;D i) can take at most 2N 1 values corresponding










j (1   Dj)1 j where j
denotes the jth component of  and 1f:g is the indicator function. For example, if N = 3
and fi(x;D i) = maxj6=i(Dj) we have that f1(x;D 1) = maxf1;1gD2D3 +maxf1;0gD2(1 
D3)+maxf0;1g(1 D2)D3+maxf0;0g(1 D2)(1 D3) = D2(1 D3)+D3(1 D2)+D2D3
(and analogously for i = 2;3). By Assumption 1, in a single equilibrium indexed by l,
E[fi(X;(S
l




























j(X;j)jX = x) as before, pl
 i(x)  (pl
j(x))j6=i, and P l(!jx) denotes
the probability that \the event ! happens conditional on x" as implied in the equilibrium
pl. Notice also that the mapping fi : 
X  [0;1]N 1 ! R is a simple extension of fi :

X  f0;1gN 1 ! R to 
X  [0;1]N 1. It is known as long as fi is known. The equations









for all i = 1;:::;N
Then the results in Proposition 1 now apply with l
i(x)  fi(x;pl
 i(x)). Note that, by the





















(D i = jx)] (4)

























f(D i;Di) = (;1)jxg] (5)






j(x))1 j under Assumption 1, and the second equilibrium follows from the Law of To-
tal Probability and the denition of P (jx). Hence p
i(x), 
i (x) as dened in (4) and ~ 
i (x)
as dened in (5) can all be expressed in terms of observable distributions. Thus the sign of
i(x) is identied and multiple BNE can be detected as in Proposition 1.
3.2 Allowing for unique BNE
The result in part (ii) of Proposition 1 shows that the sign of interaction eects for i under x
can be recovered provided that there exist multiple BNE at x in the DGP and that i follows
dierent strategies across these equilibria. This result does not warrant the identication
of sign(i(x)) for all (i;x), because there can exist players who employ the same strategies
across all equilibria under x. This could happen when there is a unique BNE under state x.
It could also occur if the game involves three or more players and, for some player i, all of






x;, so that ~ 
i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x).) The following example illustrates this possibility.
Example 1. (A player who follows the same strategy in multiple BNE) Consider a sim-
ple 3-by-2 game with N = 3, where the identities of all three players are observable in data.
Suppress the dependence on x for notational ease. Let u1 = 0:5, u2 = u3 = 0:3611, i =  1




1 = 0:0611; p
a






1 = 0:0611; p
b
2 = 0:0107; p
b
3 = 0:7756
In these two BNE (pa and pb), Player 1 chooses alternative 1 with the same probability in
both BNE, while both 2 and 3 play strategies that imply dierent choice probabilities in
equilibrium (i.e. pa
i 6= pb
i for i = 2;3). k
This issue can be solved if, for the (i;x) considered, the signs or the magnitudes
of the interaction eects are known to remain the same over a set of covariate realizations
(for example because of parameter constancy or, more generally, exclusion restrictions). In
such cases, the researcher can pool information from games with heterogeneous covariates to
help identify the signs of interaction eects for such a (i;x). We consider these two scenarios
for the rest of this subsection.
Aggregating data from games with the same sign of i(x)
Consider a simplied case where strategic interaction eects have the same sign for all
x 2 
X for some i. Then sign(i()) is identied if and only if the set of states where i
uses multiple BNE strategies in the DGP has a positive measure under FX. To see this,
note that i(x) > (<) 0 if ~ 
i (x)   p
i(x)
i (x) > (<) 0. Furthermore, if i(x) > (<) 0
and multiple equilibria are played in the DGP under x, then ~ 
i (x)   p
i(x)
i (x) > (<) 0.
It then follows that if the set of x under which i adopts multiple BNE strategies occurs
with positive probability, then the sign of E[~ 
i (X)   p
i(X)
i (X)] is the same as the sign
of i(). On the other hand, if i sticks to a single BNE strategy for (FX-almost) every x,
then ~ 
i (x) = p
i(x)
i (x) FX-a.e. and E[~ 
i (X)   p
i(X)
i (X)] = 0. The following corollary
formalizes and generalizes this idea.
15Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and there is a known set !i such that sign(i(:))
remains the same for all x 2 !i. Then (i) sign(i(:)) is recovered on !i as the sign of
E[~ 
i (X)   p
i(X)
i (X)jX 2 !i] if
Prfx 2 !i : i follows multiple BNE strategies at xg > 0 (6)
and (ii) the condition in (6) holds if and only if
E[~ 





i (X)jX 2 !i]:
Corollary 1 shows that sign(i(x)) can be identied even when there is a unique
BNE at x, as long as i employs multiple BNE strategies with positive probability over a
set of x0 with sign(i(x)) = sign(i(x0)). The corollary is a straightforward consequence of
Proposition 1.
Aggregating data from games with the same size of i(x)
So far identication of i(x) has relied on existence of multiple BNE. For the rest of this
section, we consider a DGP where the BNE adopted at each x may be unique. We show that
sign(i(x)) can still be recovered in this case if an exclusion restriction holds. This strategy
is also invoked in similar contexts in the literature. To understand this exclusion restriction,
consider a game involving N rms which make simultaneous entry or exit decisions. The
vector of states X include a subvector ~ X0 consisting of market- or sector-wide factors that
aect the demand for rm products. X also includes mutually exclusive subvectors ( ~ Xi)iN
with ~ Xi capturing rm-specic factors that only aect the prots for Firm i but none of
its rivals. For example, ~ Xi may include labor costs or local regulations pertaining to the
geographic location of i. The vector of private information (i)iN may well capture all other
rm-specic prot factors (such as idiosyncratic costs) that are unobservable to opponents
and econometricians. If rivals' idiosyncratic factors (such as labor costs) have no bearing on
Firm i's prots in addition to ~ X0 and ~ Xi, then FijX = FijXi where Xi = ( ~ X0; ~ Xi). For each
16(i;x), we refer to the set i(xi)  fx0 : x0
i = xig as the equivalence class for i at x. We state
the exclusion restriction assumption as follows:
Assumption 2 For all i, there exists a strict subvector of X (denoted Xi) such that ui(x) =
ui(xi), i(x) = i(xi) , FijX=x = FijXi=xi for all x.
The main idea for identifying sign(i(x)) (even when i only has a unique BNE strategy
at each realization x) is based on three observations: (a) Player i can adopt dierent BNE
strategies across games with states in the equivalence class (as long as uj(x0);j(x0);FjjX=x0
vary over i(xi)); (b) By assumption, the equilibrium conditions relating player i's strategies
and those of the rivals' in any single BNE characterized by (1) must take the same form for
all x0 in i(xi); and (c) The way opponents' choice probabilities aect i's choice probability
across dierent x0 in i(xi) is only determined by the sign of the strategic interaction eect
for i, which is the same for all x0 in i(xi) under the exclusion restriction in Assumption 2.
Consequently, we can use an argument similar to that in Section 3.1 to identify sign(i(x)).
If in response to her opponents' equilibrium strategies, i is induced to adopt dierent BNE
strategies across games with dierent states in the equivalence class for x, then the sign of
the correlation between actions by i and competitors across these games identies sign(i(x))
just as in our previous analysis.
Let 
xi be the probability distribution over equilibrium choice probability proles in
the equivalence class for xi. It is obtained by integrating the equilibrium selection mechanism
x across the states in i(xi) with respect to conditional distribution FXjX2i(xi). That is,










where x denotes the equilibrium selection probabilities dened in Section 2. It is easy to
verify that 
xi is a well-dened distribution. Let its support be denoted by L
xi.
The key condition for identifying i(x) is that player i adopts varying strategies across
BNE in dierent games whose states belong to the equivalence class for i at x. Formally,
17the distribution 
xi is non-degenerate in i's dimension if @t 2 [0;1] such that the support
L
xi  fp 2 [0;1]N : pi = tg. We give a simple illustration of Assumption 2 and the non-
degeneracy condition in Design 2 of the Monte Carlo section. We also this assumption in
greater detail following Proposition 2. Let g index independent games observed in data, and
let Di;g denote the decision made by i in game g. Dene
	i(xi)  E[Di;g (j6=iDj;g)jXg 2 i(xi)]   E[Di;gjXg 2 i(x)]E[j6=iDj;gjXg 2 i(xi)]
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (i) at any x, sign(i(x)) =
sign(	i(xi)) for all i if 
xi is non-degenerate in i's dimension; and (ii) 
xi is non-degenerate
in i's dimension if and only if 	i(xi) 6= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any pair of (i;x) such that 
xi is not degenerate.
The equations in (1) and Assumption 2 imply that there exists a function hi such that
l
i(z) = hi(pl
i(z)) for all z 2 i(xi) and pl 2 L+







function hi summarizes the interdependence between i's BNE strategies and those for j 6= i.
If 











































where p 2 [0;1]N denotes a generic characterization of BNE on the support L
xi. The rst
equality follows from the denition of 
xi and the second from independence between Di and
(Dj)j6=i conditional on the equilibrium played and on states being in the equivalence class.


















xi is the marginal distribution of pi according to the joint distribution 
xi. Finally,
note hi() is increasing (or decreasing) over [0;N   1] if i(x) > 0 (or < 0) for x 2 i(xi).
18Hence the same argument as in Proposition 1 shows that for all (i;x), 	i(xi) > 0 (or < 0)
if i(x) > 0 (or < 0) and 
xi is non-degenerate in i's dimension. It also follows immediately
from (8) that if 
xi is degenerate in i's dimension, then 	i(xi) = 0.
That the distribution 
xi is non-degenerate in i's dimension is a weak restriction given
Assumption 2. For this to hold, it is necessary that i(x) 6= 0 and (uj;j;FjjX) for j 6= i
vary over states in the equivalence class for i. The non-degeneracy can fail in cases such as
when player i does not interact with rivals at all at x (i(x) = 0).6 Part (ii) of Proposition
2 suggests an immediate test for the non-degeneracy condition using observed distributions
of states and actions. The example below shows how the non-degeneracy condition can hold
for all (i;x) under fairly intuitive restrictions.
Example 2. (Non-degeneracy for all i;x) Consider a 2-by-2 entry or exit game with in-
complete information between Firm 1 and 2 with state vector X which can be partitioned
as ( ~ X0; ~ X1; ~ X2), where ~ X0 are market-level factors that aect protability of the rms and
~ X1 and ~ X2 are rm-level characteristics for Firm 1 and 2, respectively. Suppose i(x) 6= 0
for all i;x and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold with X1  ( ~ X0; ~ X1) and X2  ( ~ X0; ~ X2). Assume
further that the interaction eects and the distribution private information only depend on
market level factors ~ X0 (i(xi) = i(~ x0) and FijXi=xi = Fij ~ X0=~ x0 for both i and all xi). Then
for i = 1;2, the probability of entering (choosing action 1) in a BNE is given by:
pi(x) = Fij~ x0(ui(xi) + i(~ x0)p3 i(x))
Assume for any x1 = (~ x0; ~ x1), there exists a set of ~ x2 (denoted !2) that occur with posi-
tive probability and leads to dierent baseline prots. That is, Prf ~ X1 2 !2jx1g > 0 and
u2(~ x0; ~ x2) 6= u2(~ x0; ~ x0
2) for all ~ x2 6= ~ x0
2 in !2. It then follows that for any pair of states
x  (~ x0; ~ x1; ~ x2) and x0  (~ x0; ~ x1; ~ x0
2), 
x1 is non-degenerate in i's dimension for any x1.7
6When i(x) 6= 0, this condition can also fail if best responses for j 6= i change over the equivalence class
for i at x in very peculiar ways so that the solution for pi() in (1) for x 2 	i(xi) remains the same.
7To see this, note F1j ~ X0=~ x0(u1(~ x0; ~ x1)+1(~ x0)t) as a function of t over [0;1] remains the same for x and
x0, while F2j ~ X0=~ x0(u2(~ x0; ~ x2) + 2(~ x0)t) 6= F2j ~ X0=~ x0(u2(~ x0; ~ x0
2) + 2(~ x0)t) for all t 2 [0;1].
19Swapping 1 with 2 and repeating the arguments above shows 
x2 can be non-degenerate in
2's dimension for any x2. k
We conclude our discussion by noting that the exclusion restriction in Assumption 2
is stronger than necessary for identifying sign(i(x)). In fact the preceding arguments can
be extended easily to accommodate general forms of equivalence classes fx0 2 
X : ui(x0) =
ui(x) , i(x0) = i(x) and Fijx = Fijx0g. In particular, if no variables are excluded for indi-
vidual i and the equivalence class for i at x is a singleton, then the non-degeneracy of 
x on
i's dimension will amount to the existence of multiple BNE strategies at state x.
4 Testing Multiple BNE and Inferring Interaction Signs
The test for multiple equilibria is of practical importance in structural empirical research.
When the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities are the same for all players in a game,
the average choice in each game is an unbiased estimator for the conditional choice proba-
bilities within a particular equilibrium (see, for example, Brock and Durlauf (2007), p.58).
However, even when all players have identical payo functions (ui() and i()) and private
information distributions (FijX) though, asymmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria with dier-
ent conditional choice probabilities across players may arise. This will happen for instance
when the (common) () is negative. When the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities
dier across players and/or number of players in each game is small (as is typically the case
in the empirical games literature), the conditional choice probabilities will not be reliably
estimated within individual games. It is then necessary to pool data across games in which
the same equilibrium is played so as to estimate the choice probabilities using more data. In
this case, testing for multiple equilibria is of interest in its own right.
Besides, most of the known methods for semi-parametric estimation of incomplete
information games (without explicitly specifying an equilibrium selection rule) have relied
20on the existence of a single equilibrium in the data (e.g. Aradillas-Lopez (2010), Bajari,
Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010) and Tang (2010)).8 Hence it is imperative to devise a
formal test for the assumption of unique equilibrium in the data-generating process.
We focus on an empirical context where researchers observe states and decisions from
a large cross-section of independent games (indexed by g = 1;:::;G) drawn from the same
DGP characterized by (ui;i)iN;FjX. Consider the null hypothesis that a \unique BNE
exists in the DGP under state x ". By Proposition 1, the null of a unique BNE in the DGP
is equivalently formulated as:
H0 : i(x) = 0 8i  N (9)
We confront this null hypothesis with the alternative that:
H1 : 9i s.t. i(x) 6= 0 (10)
where
i(x)  ~ 







j6=i fE[DiDjjx]   E(Dijx)E(Djjx)g:
It follows from Section 3 that i(x) 6= 0 if and only if i adopts multiple strategies with
positive probability at x. In the appendix we propose a simple Wald Test that can be used
to test the joint null in (9) at x. We also note that the parameter i(x) can be easily adapted
to accommodate general (known) fi(x;D i) as indicated previously.
A failure to reject the null of unique equilibrium in the DGP suggests the equilibrium
conditions in (1) can be used for estimation. It is then possible to invoke additional as-
sumptions on u;;Fjx to identify the model structure. Examples of such restrictions include
the index utilities and statistical or median independence of private information or even the
knowledge of F. In implementation, sampling errors from such a pre-test for unique equilib-
rium should ideally be accounted for in deriving asymptotic properties. If the joint null of
unique BNE is rejected, then nding out which of the N single nulls in (1) are responsible
8For an illustration of how misspecication of the equilibrium selection rule can aect inference in a
complete information game with a small number of players, see Honor e and de Paula (2010).
21for the rejection can help with robust estimation. We further motivate and address this
question using a multiple-testing procedure in Section 4.1 below.
Finally, note that with N = 2 multiple BNE exist at x only if signs of individual
interaction eects are the same for both players. In this case, both players adopt strategies
that imply distinct conditional choice probabilities across these BNE. Testing for multiple
equilibria and inference of signs of interaction eects can be done by testing sample correla-
tion of actions between the two players (given X). In this case, inference of multiple BNE
and signs of interaction eects will be based on a scalar statistic TG  TG;1 = TG;2 as dened
later in this section.
4.1 Inference of Players With Multiple Equilibrium Strategies
With N  3, while a subset of the players may employ dierent strategies across multiple
BNE in the DGP, others might stick to the same strategy in all games observed in the data
(see Example 1). Finding out the set of players who adopt multiple strategies has important
implications for identifying and estimating players' payos. Semi-parametric estimation of
Bayesian games typically refrains from parametric restrictions on primitives or the equilib-
rium selection mechanism at the cost of assuming that there is only a unique DGP for all
x in the data. The applicability of these robust estimation approaches hinges on this single
equilibrium assumption.9 While a simple test of the joint null (9) using Wald statistics helps
detect existence of multiple BNE, it does not specify any rules for deciding which players
employ dierent strategies across multiple BNE.
Since we would like to detect which players employ dierent strategies across BNE
and make inference on those players' interaction eects signs, we resort to the statistical
literature on multiple comparisons (for a recent survey, see Lehmann and Romano (2005),
9It should be noted that \social interaction"models do not rely on this assumption but require the
number of agents in each game to be large so that within (symmetric) equilibrium choice probabilities can
be consistently estimated from average choices in each game.
22Chapter 9). This literature considers decision strategies that aggregate the tests for the
individual hypotheses corresponding to each i given x:
H
0
i : i(x) = 0
H
1
i : i(x) 6= 0
Given individual test statistics for each of the i  N hypotheses, our objective is to dene a
decision rule that controls the family-wise error rate, or the probability of rejecting at least
one of the true null hypotheses. That is:
FWEP = ProbPfReject at least one H
0
i : i(x) = 0 where i 2 I0(P)g
where the subscript P indicates the DGP and I0(P)  f1;:::;Ng is the set of indices i
of true null hypotheses under P. A multiple testing procedure asymptotically controls the
FWEP at  if limsupG!+1 FWEP   for any P.
We focus on a nite support 
X and we suppress x for notational ease when there
is no ambiguity. Sample analogs of expectations conditional on x are simply calculated as
the sample averages across games with X = x. Whereas this is easily done when 
X is
discrete, a sample analog for a continuous X would involve the aggregation of realizations at
\nearby" observations via nonparametric techniques (e.g. kernel methods). Since covariates
may induce a dierent number of equilibria, in small samples the inference for a particular
realization in 
X may be contaminated by the uniqueness or multiplicity of solutions at
neighboring realizations. Note nevertheless that the identication arguments do not require
that 
X have nite support. A thorough analysis of this inference problem under continuous
covariates is beyond the scope of this paper.
We focus on the case with N  3. For any subset I  f1;:::;Ng, let DI;g 
i2IDi;g, I  E(DI;g1(Xg 2 fxg)) and 0  Pr(Xg 2 fxg).10 In addition, (fxg) denotes








-vector consisting of 0(fxg);i(fxg) and ij(fxg) for all individual
10If 0(fxg) = 1, an unconditional version of our procedure can be easily derived.
23i and all pairs i 6= j. For example, with N = 3 (and omitting the argument fxg),  
(0;1;2;3;12;13;23)0. Dene:
^ i(fxg)  (G)
 1 X
g Di;g1(Xg 2 fxg) ; ^ ij(fxg)  (G)
 1 X
g Dij;g1(Xg 2 fxg)
^ 0(fxg)  (G)
 1 X
g 1(Xg 2 fxg) ; ^ G(fxg)  (^ 0(fxg);:::; ^ i(fxg);:::; ^ ij(fxg);:::)
0
where ^ G is the vector of sample analogs for . By the multivariate central limit theorem,
G1=2(G(fxg) (fxg))
d  ! N(0 ~ N;(fxg)) as G ! 1, where 0 ~ N is a ~ N-vector of zeros and
 is the corresponding variance-covariance matrix. Dene TG(fxg) to be a N-vector with
its i-th coordinate being:














0) as G ! 1
where (x)  (i(x))N
i=1. The Jacobian V(fxg) is a N-by- ~ N matrix, with its i-th row
Vi(fxg) dened by the following table (where (m)(fxg);Vi;(m)(fxg) denote the m-th coordi-

















ij(fxg) or ji(fxg) : 1
0(fxg)
jk(fxg) : 0
We can estimate (fxg);V(fxg) consistently by replacing 0(fxg);I(fxg) with the
sample analogs described above. For the remainder of this subsection, we omit the argument
(fxg) for notational ease.
24Well-known methods that asymptotically control for the family-wise error rate include
the Bonferroni and the Holm's method. Both methods can be described in terms of the p-
values for each of the individual hypotheses (indexed by i) above. We denote these p-values
by ^ pG;i. The Bonferroni method at level  rejects i if ^ pG;i  =N. The Holm's procedure,
which is less conservative than the Bonferroni method, follows a stepwise strategy. (For
notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of the hypotheses and test statistics
on x.) The Holm's procedure starts by ordering the p-values in ascending order: ^ pG;(1) 
^ pG;(2)    ^ pG;(N). Let H0
jk : jk = 0 denote the single hypothesis corresponding to the k-
th smallest p-value (i.e. ^ pG;jk = ^ pG;(k)). Holm's stepwise method proceeds as follows. In the
rst step, compare ^ pG;(1) with =N. If ^ pG;(1)  =N, then accept all individual hypotheses
and the procedure ends. Otherwise, reject the individual null hypothesis H0
j1 : j1 = 0 and
move on to the second step. In the second step, the remaining N   1 hypotheses are all
accepted if ^ pG;(2)  =(N  1). Otherwise reject H0
j2 : j2 = 0 and continue to the next step.
More generally, compare ^ pG;(k) with =(N   k + 1) in the k-th step. Accept all remaining
N  (k  1) hypotheses if ^ pG;(k)  =(N  k +1). Otherwise, reject H0
jk and move on to the
next step. Continue doing so until all remaining hypotheses are accepted, or all hypotheses
are rejected one by one in N steps.
Though less conservative than the Bonferroni method, the Holm's procedure can still
be improved upon if one takes into account the dependence between individual test statistics.
To achieve this, we follow recent contributions by van der Laan, Dudoit, and Pollard (2004)
and Romano and Wolf (2005).11 Ordering the test statistics in descending order, we let
TG;(1)  TG;(2)    TG;(N). In the k-th step, a critical level ck is obtained and those
hypotheses with TG;  ck are rejected. Let Rk be the number of hypotheses rejected after
the rst k   1 steps (i.e. the number of hypotheses rejected at the beginning of the k-th
step). As before, let H0
ik denote the hypothesis whose test statistic is the k-th largest (i.e.
11The following description closely follows the presentation in Romano and Wolf (2005). For similar
strategies controlling generalizations of the family-wise error rate, see Romano and Shaikh (2006). A recent
application of such generalizations is Moon and Perron (2009).
25TG;ik = TG;(k)). Ideally, we want to obtain c1 such that:






TG;(j)   ij  y

 1   

where all statements are implicitly conditional on X = x. Subsequently, ck is dened as






TG;(j)   ij  y

 1   

(also conditional on X = x). As pointed out in the references cited, because P is unknown
in practice, we replace P by an estimate ^ PG and dene
^ ck  ck(1   ; ^ PG) = inf











 1   

(11)
where we follow Romano and Wolf (2005) and use T 
G;(j) and 
ij to highlight that the
sampling distribution of the test statistics is under ^ PG (not P). The stepwise multiple
testing procedure from Romano and Wolf (2005) can be summarized by algorithm A1 in
the Appendix. In addition to estimating ^ ck via bootstrap, we also consider an alternative
approach that uses the fact that the test statistics have a normal limiting distribution with a
consistently estimable variance-covariance matrix.12 We summarize the two approaches for
estimating ^ ck in two algorithms A2 and A3 in the Appendix.
We can also use a studentized version of the multiple testing method as recommended
in Romano and Wolf (2005). Let ^ G;k denote the estimates for the standard deviation of the
test statistic TG;k. To do so, we need an analogue of (11):
^ dk  dk(1   ; ^ PG)  inf











 1   

where ^ 
G;i are the estimates for standard deviations of TG;i computed from bootstrap samples.
A description of the procedure for the studentized statistic is presented in algorithm A.4 in
the Appendix.
For a parametric model with state-independent interaction eects, Sweeting (2009)
proposed two procedures to check for multiple symmetric equilibria in the data. The rst
12See footnote 21 in Romano and Wolf (2005).
26is based on calculating the percentage of pairs of players whose actions are correlated. The
other is based on testing signicance of equilibrium selection probabilities using Maximum
Likelihood estimates with the number of BNE considered equal to two. Hence the second
procedure is a test of the null of unique BNE against the alternative of two BNE in the DGP.
In comparison, we develop stronger and new results by extending this intuition in a more
general context. The most important distinction is that our test can be applied in cases
where individual-specic interaction eects may depend on the states in unrestricted ways,
and asymmetric equilibria may arise due to heterogeneities in players' payos. Furthermore,
our test addresses several additional subtle issues. First, our test for multiple BNE in the data
is based on testing whether each individual's action is correlated with an aggregate measure
of competitors' actions. Therefore, our test has power under alternatives in which multiple
BNE exist in the data with only a very small number of players switching strategies across
the multiple equilibria. Second, our approach does not require knowledge of the number
of equilibria in the alternative. Third, we apply a multiple testing procedure proposed by
Romano and Wolf (2005) to test the joint null hypothesis that the equilibrium in the data is
unique. And if the joint null is rejected, the procedure infers the exact identities of players
who have switched between strategies in the data. Last, our test can be extended to allow
for correlation private signals if researchers know a priori the groups/clusters of observed
games within which the same equilibrium is played. (See Section 5.)
In Section 6, we report the performance of three tests based on stepwise multiple
testing procedures: (a) the non-studentized test with ^ ck computed from parametric simula-
tions; (b) the non-studentized test with ^ ck computed via bootstrap; and (c) the studentized
test with ^ dk computed via bootstrap. Because our setting corresponds to the smooth func-
tion model with i.i.d. data (Scenario 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005)), both strategies yield
consistent tests that asymptotically control the family-wise error rate at level . This would
obtain from a slight modication in Theorem 3.1 in Romano and Wolf (2005) to accommo-
date two-sided hypotheses as indicated in Section 5 of that paper.
274.2 Inference on Signs of Interaction Eects
This section proposes a simple test for the sign of interaction eects for a player i in a given
state x. It relies on the characterization in Proposition 2 and will hold when x induces
multiple equilibria and choice probabilities vary across equilibria or when there are excluded
regressors as discussed in Section 3. We focus on the simple case with discrete X where any
x in the support can happen with strictly positive probabilities. For any i;x, dene










which is analogous to the statistic dened in the previous subsection, but with 1(X 2 i(x))
in place of 1(X 2 fxg) when dening ^ m. This statistic is an estimator for 	i introduced
in Proposition 2. When i(x) = fxg, this statistic coincides with the statistic introduced
in subsection 4.1. For notational ease, we drop the subscript i;x from the estimators when
there is no ambiguity. Using the Delta Method and Slutsky's Theorem it is straightforward
to verify that





d  ! N(0;1) as G ! 1
where ^ V(i(x)) and ^ (i(x)) are estimators for V(i(x)) and (i(x)), which themselves
are dened analogously to the discussion in subsection 4.1. Testing the existence of multiple
equilibria in the data and the sign of i(x) amounts to testing the following three hypotheses:
H+ : 	i(x) > 0 ; H0 : 	i(x) = 0 ; H  : 	i(x) < 0:
Rejection of H0 in favor of H+ is indicative of multiple equilibria and a positive sign for i(x).
Analogously, rejection of H0 in favor of H  is indicative of multiple equilibria and a negative
sign for i(x). Acceptance of H0 suggests a unique equilibrium in the data and judgement on
the sign of i(x) is withheld. Using the test statistic
p
G(^ V(i(x))^ (i(x))^ V(i(x))0) 1=2
TG;i(i(x)), we can choose critical regions at the two tails, each resulting in the rejection
of H0 in favor of either H+ or H .13 Proofs of consistency and asymptotic levels of the
13This is a directional hypothesis test. For a recent survey, see Shaer (2006).
28test follow from standard arguments. The player-specic sign tests can also be aggregated
according to the procedure in the previous subsection (see, e.g., Shaer (2006)).
5 Extension: Correlated Private Information
It is possible to relax Assumption 1 regarding (conditional) independence of private informa-
tion variables across players if one can ascribe groups of observations to the same equilibrium
(whenever they have identical covariates). We retain the assumption that i has positive
density over R. We refer to sets of observations playing the same equilibrium as clusters.
For example, a market or household observed two or more times or a geographic cluster of
games could comprise a cluster. We assume that:
Assumption 3 Game observations are grouped into (non-singleton) clusters such that a
single equilibrium is played within a cluster and chosen (across clusters) according to x.
In the spirit of Myerson (1991) (pp.371-2)'s remark, a group may be dened by a
geographical region or cultural trait. It is also common in the literature to rely on multiple
observations of a static game (e.g. market or household) (see Sweeting (2009) or Bajari,
Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010)). As long as equilibria do not change across these
observations, they constitute what we call a cluster.14 Notice nevertheless that dierent
equilibria may be played across clusters. The objective here is to test whether multiple
equilibria are indeed played across clusters and use this to infer the sign of interaction
eects. For simplicity here, assume that there are only two players and we have access to
two observations from a particular cluster with covariate realization equal to x. The idea is to
permute the players across games from the same cluster to generate independence of actions
when there is only one equilibrium. Observed games are assumed to be iid. Because games
within a given cluster follow this equilibrium by assumption, even after the permutation of
14Note that, even though these clusters are dened a priori, the single equilibrium assumption within a
cluster is also testable by the exact same arguments put forward in Section 3.
29players, the same equilibrium will still be played in the (permuted) game. Since the games
are independent (even within a cluster), the private signals for two players of dierent games
within a cluster will be independent. Consequently, the permutation allows us to mimic
Assumption 1 even if signals are not independent within a game.
Because 's may be dependent within a game, with two players the strategies in







j(x;j)jx;i)   i  0

(12)
for i 6= j 2 f1;2g. Let  = (1;2) and 0 = (0
1;0
2) denote private information variables
in dierent observations from the same cluster. Analogously, the covariates for these two
observations are given by X and X0. More concretely, if the cluster consists of observations
of a market or household for two periods, primed and non-primed variables will correspond
to observations in dierent periods. Permuting players consists of pairing Firm 1's action in

















since F;0jX=X0=x(;) = FjX=x()F0jX0=x(). Consequently, when a single equilibrium is
played in the data, the (permutation) covariance of actions will be zero (regardless of whether
Assumption 1 holds).
If there is more than one equilibrium in the data, the covariance of actions within
permuted games (i.e. observed actions by pairs of players matched together from dierent
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30where Si = Si(x;i) and S0
i = Si(x;0
i) and the second and third equalities follow from the


























































2). The sign argument now follows if we show that,
given x;0









1) (and vice-versa when i(x) < 0). For this, the following assumption is
sucient (though not necessary):
Assumption 4 For any two equilibria in the support of the equilibrium selection mechanism
and any player i, Sl and Sk, either Sl
i(x;i)  Sk
i (x;i) for any i 2 R or Sl
i(x;i)  Sk
i (x;i)
for any i 2 R.
This condition will hold for example under conditional independence of privately
observed variables. It also holds when the equilibrium strategies are monotone as assumed
in Wan and Xu (2010) and implicitly in Berry and Tamer (2007). A sucient condition for
this is the Single Crossing Property from Athey (2001) (see also Reny (forthcoming)). The
assumption can hold more generally though.











1) whenever i(x) > 0 (see equation 12). Because of the assumption above, we
have Sl
1(x;1)  Sk
1(x;1) for every 1. It should also be that f1 : Sl
1(x;1) > Sk
1(x;1)g
has positive measure. Suppose this is not the case and Sl
1(x;1) = Sk
1(x;1) for (almost-
)every 1. If this holds, E(Sl
1(x;1)jx;2) = E(Sk





2(x;2)jx;1) and contradicting the
original assumption. We then obtain that E(Sl
1(x;1)jx;2) > E(Sk
1(x;1)jx;2). Conse-
31quently the conditional covariance above is positive. Similarly we can show that the covari-
ance is negative when i(x) < 0. This discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold and games are iid. (i) For any given x,
multiple BNE exist in the data-generating process if and only if cov(S1;S0
2jX = X0 = x) 6= 0;
(ii) For all x such that cov(S1;S0




0 = x)) = sign(i(x)); i 2 f1;2g
Since equilibria are allocated to clusters according to the equilibrium selection mech-
anism x, this strategy can be implemented using one permuted game from each cluster or
a balanced number of permuted games from each cluster. We note nevertheless that even
if a dierent number of permuted games is selected from each cluster, the procedure would
still eectively detect multiplicity and identify the signs of the interaction eects, though the
mixing distribution in this case will be dierent from (though dependent on) the equilibrium
selection mechanism.
6 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section we explore Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate the strategy presented in
the previous section. The rst design reproduces Example 1 and displays multiple equilibria.
We use it to analyze the inference procedure on the existence of multiple equilibria and on
the interaction signs when more than one equilibrium exists. Design 2 displays only one
equilibrium and we use it to illustrate our procedure when multiple equilibria are absent but
an excluded variable exists.
Design 1. We study the nite sample performance of the tests for multiple equilibria in
Section 4 using a simple design of a 3-by-2 game in Example 1. The design is conditional on
some state x and this dependence is suppressed for notational convenience. For some xed
32state, let the players' baseline payos be u1 = 0:5 and u2 = u3 = 0:3611, respectively, and
let i =  1 and i  N( = 0:1;2 = 0:252) for all i. Let  denote the probability with
which the rst Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (6) shows up in the data-generating process.
We experiment with  = 0:1, 0:25 or 0:5 and sample sizes G = 1000 or 3000.



















  i;g  0
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where in each game g  G, Wg is simulated from a Bernoulli distribution with success
probability , i;g from N(0:1;0:252) and pls are propensity-scores in the two Bayesian Nash
equilibria. For each (;G), we simulate S = 1000 data sets. For each data set, we employ
the stepwise multiple testing procedure as described in Section 4.2, and make a decision to
reject or not to reject the null hypothesis that there is a unique equilibrium in the data-
generating process. We experiment with three dierent approaches for choosing the critical
level ^ ck in Section 4.2: (i) simulation using estimated covariance matrix of TG; (ii) bootstrap;
and (iii) studentized bootstrap (Algorithms 3.2 and 4.2 in Romano and Wolf (2005)). For
meaningful comparison between these three approaches, we use the same number of simulated
multivariate normal vectors in (i) as the number of bootstrap samples drawn in (ii) and (iii)
(which is denoted by B). We experiment with B = 1000;2000. In Table 1 below, we report
the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypothesis (i.e., rejecting H0 for i = 1)
calculated from the S = 1000 simulated data sets in columns RP 1;2;3.
Table 2 presents the tests of interaction signs for each of the three players. Since
player 1 has the same conditional choice probabilities in the two equilibria, the test with-
holds judgment for most of the simulations. It detects a negative sign for the other two
players.
Design 2. In this design, we consider a 3-by-2-action game where Assumption 2 is satised.
The baseline payo for player i is ui(xi) = 1 + xi where x1 2 f 1;2g and x2 2 f 1=2;3=2g
and x3 2 f 1;3g. Covariate realizations have the same probability. The state-dependent
33interaction eect for i is i(xi) = xi where  is a parameter that controls the scale of
the interaction eect. The private information i is uniformly distributed over ( ci;ci),
where ci = 2(1 + xi + jxij).15 Table 3 lists the marginal choice probabilities, or propen-
sity scores, pi(x)  Pr(i chooses 1jx) in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibria for each state
x  (x1;x2;x3). It is easy to verify that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique for all
x from Table 3, since all i is uniformly distributed and all propensity scores are strictly
between 0 and 1.
To illustrate the non-degeneracy condition of  in Section 3.2, notice that, when
x1 =  1, the equivalence class is 1(x1) = f( 1; 1=2; 1); ( 1; 1=2;3); ( 1;3=2; 1);
( 1;3=2; 1)g. In this case, because the equilibrium is unique at each of these four points
in 
X, x() is a degenerate distribution putting probability one on the unique equilibrium
for each covariate realization x. Accordingly, 
xi(p) = 1=4 if p 2 f(0:3233;0:5603;0:3233);
(0:2523;0:5288;0:7098); (0:2998;0:7013;0:2998); (0:2101;0:7262;0:7231)g and is zero other-
wise. The important implication is that for each one of these realizations, player 1 adopts
a dierent equilibrium strategy, which implies dierent a conditional choice probability of
choosing 1. As we vary the covariates for the other players while xing x1 at -1, we are able
to identify the sign of x1.
In Design 2, strategic interaction eects are state-dependent and individual-specic.
For player 1, states in the rst four rows in Table 3 form an equivalence class, while the
other four rows form another equivalence class. We simulate S = 1000 samples, each with
sample size G = 5000. For each of these samples, we calculate the test statistics ^ 	 as
dened in Section 4 and apply the following decision rule. If TG;i <  1:64, then reject H0
(no interaction eect) in favor of H  (negative interaction eect). If TG;i > 1:64, then reject
H0 in favor of H+ (positive interaction eect). Otherwise, do not reject H0. Table 4 below
summarizes the nite sample performance of our test. The two entries [q+;q ] in the brackets
15The parameter ci is chosen this way to ensure there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under each
state.
34report percentages of tests in S = 1000 simulations where H2 is rejected in favor of H+ (i.e.,
q+) and the percentage of rejections in favor of H  (i.e. q ), respectively. Recall that the
sign of interaction eects for i(xi) is the same as the sign of xi in our design as  > 0.
7 Empirical Illustration
In this section we investigate how radio stations strategically allocate commercial breaks
during their programming schedule. The interaction eects on the payos of broadcasting
commercials ((X)) can be either positive or negative. As explained by Sweeting (2009), if
radio stations air commercials at the same time listeners may be dissuaded from switching
stations to avoid breaks, and the audience for a particular station is not aected by the
decision to broadcast a commercial. On the other hand, if listeners have an outside option
(i.e. public radio, a CD, TV), synchronization by all stations risks ultimately driving listeners
away, reducing audience for all radio stations. Alternating commercial breaks would in this
case be preferable (see Sweeting (2006) for a simple model). Whereas advertisers would like
stations to coordinate to preclude consumers from avoiding the ads, radio stations may have
an incentive to alternate as ratings are computed on average listenership, not audiences of
commercials. Lack of coordination by the radio stations would suggest that the market does
not align incentives of advertisers and radio stations.
Sweeting (2009) examined this question by estimating a parametric model. His base-
line specications assumed that (1) stations care symmetrically about their interactions with
all other stations in the market and (2) that symmetric equilibria are played. Based on these
assumptions, he found that stations prefer to choose the same time for commercials dur-
ing drivetime hours, with stronger preferences in smaller markets. Our methodology allows
us to test whether Sweeting's conclusions are robust to relaxing these possibly restrictive
assumptions in a nonparametric setting.
Because programmers have to allocate advertisements in real time (i.e. on the spot)
35around the usual schedule of songs and news updates without interrupting those pieces of
programming, there is uncertainty as to when commercial breaks can be aired. The exact
sequence of songs and news updates is not publicly distributed beforehand and, as Sweeting
(2009) points out, DJs are given ample discretion over schedules (see footnote 7 in that
paper). Therefore we follow Sweeting and assume that the unobserved component of the
advertisement timing decision is private information to each radio station.
Warren (2001) mentions that airing commercials at a specic time \can be done some
of the time. But it can't be done consistently by very many stations. Few songs are 2:30
minutes long any more" (p.24) (see also Gross (1988)). Hence there is also little reason to
believe that this scheduling uncertainty is correlated given public information. This (private)
payo uncertainty to airing a commercial at specic time is captured in our model by i.
Given that commercial break choices are made within the one hour programming
horizon in real time, whether or not to advertise close to the end of that horizon will not be
be aected by continuation value considerations. Furthermore, the number of commercials
already aired earlier may induce asymmetries in the payo to broadcast a commercial at
the last minutes of the hour, which are captured by our specication. Data show that most
commercials are aired close to the end of the programming horizon (i.e. the hour), so our
focus on the end of the hour can also be justied as the relevant empirical focus.
The data sources are BIAfn's MediaAccess Pro database, Mediabase 24/7 and the
2001 Census.16 Based on detailed information on airplay logs for around the rst ve days
of each month in 2001 (59 days in total), the data report the decision of radio programmers
to broadcast commercials at minute :55 of four dierent hours of the day: noon-1pm, 4-5pm,
5-6pm and 9-10pm. We focus on the decision to broadcast commercials at minute :55 or
not since this is close to the end of the programming horizon as explained above.17 Table 5
16We thank Andrew Sweeting for providing us the data.
17Alternatively, as in some of the specications used by Sweeting (2009), if the private signal variables
follow an extreme value distribution we can restrict our analysis to the choice between :50 and :55 conditional
on airing commercials at one of these times. Even though we do not impose a particular distributional
36depicts the frequency of choices (airing a commercial at :55 or not).
We follow Sweeting (2009) and count music stations as players in the geographic
market to which they hold licenses. The specic allocation is done using BIAfn's MediaAccess
Pro database. There are 6,534 games at the noon-1pm hour, 6,562 games at the 4-5pm hour,
6,536 games at the 5-6pm hour and 6,520 games during the 9-10pm hour. Also available
are variables regarding market characteristics. We focus here on the market size obtained
from 2001/2 population estimates for individuals aged 12+ reported in BIAfn (based on
Census data). For our analysis, we discretize this variable into terciles with the rst tercile
corresponding to the largest markets.
To best illustrate our methodology, we focus on the three dominant radio stations in
each market according to measures of historical listernership. We label players accordingly
so that player 1 is the radio station with largest market share, player 2 is the station with the
second largest share and player 3 is the station with the third largest portion. The combined
market share is on average 41% across all markets, justifying our focus on the strategic
interactions among the three largest players. We note that our approach can accommodate
a larger numbers of players but we opt for three for illustrative purposes. For example,
payos can depend on the proportion of competitors choosing to play commercials and not
simply on their number (see previous discussion).
Table 6 displays tests of multiplicity conditional on the various hours of the day.
We present test results using Wald statistics and the multiple comparison procedure by
Romano and Wolf (2005) (with 1,000 bootstrap repetitions) at a targeted 5% FWER. For
the RW procedure we show the ordering of the individual test statistics, whether they are
positive or negative and which ones are rejected. Unconditionally and conditional on the
4-5pm and 5-6pm hours, we reject the hypothesis of a unique equilibrium and in all three
cases this is indicative of a positive strategic interaction eect. We nd evidence of multiple
assumption, one can legitimize our procedure as an approximation to a multiple action problem with Extreme
Value distributed s. We have also run our procedures using this specication and obtain qualitatively similar
results.
37equilibrium strategies (across equilibria) for all three players without conditioning on any
covariate and for the 4-5pm and 5-6pm hours of the day. Using either procedure (Wald or
Romano-Wolf), we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of a unique equilibrium for the
hours 12-1pm and 9-10pm. This is in agreement with Sweeting's ndings and the fact that
larger interaction eects will more likely lead to multiple equilibria. Because listeners are
less likely to switch o the radio to an outside option during drivetime hours, radio stations
have stronger incentives to coordinate on commercial breaks and retain listenership. In this
case, radio stations' incentives are aligned with those of advertisers.
For robustness against the possible failure of the conditional independence assump-
tion, we present permutation versions for the Wald test on Table 7 (see 5). Here we assume
that within a given geographical market (i.e. cluster), stations play the same equilibrium in
every day of our sample. Dierent equilibria may nevertheless occur across dierent clusters.
This assumption is also used in Sweeting (2009). Various permutation strategies could have
been employed, but for those results player 1 in day d is paired with player 2 in day d   1
and player 3 in day d   2. There is still evidence of multiplicity for the 4-5pm and 5-6pm
hours of the day.
As Sweeting (2009) suggests, smaller markets may present stronger incentives for
coordination. Because smaller markets have fewer stations, coordination is easier. Further-
more, if the non-dominant fringe of the market provides more alternatives to listeners as
would be the case in larger markets with more stations outside the top-three, the incentives
for coordination are not as prevalent. To examine this, we present results conditioning also
on terciles of market size. Evidence of multiplicity and positive interaction eects for all
players is salient in smallest markets during the 4-5pm and 5-6pm hours of the day but not
for the other conditional specications.
388 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how a condition typically employed in the analysis of simulta-
neous games of incomplete information leads to a simple and easily implementable test for
the signs of interaction eects and the existence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating
process. Inference of the signs of state-dependent and individual-specic interaction eects
can be done under minimal assumptions that require only the conditional independence of
private information, and the existence of state variables satisfying appropriate exclusion re-
strictions. Even when the conditional independence of private signals is not in place, we
show that identication of signs and detection of multiplicity is possible when the researcher
can observe groups of games where players are known to follow strategies prescribed by the
same equilibrium. Besides, given that many of the suggested methods for estimating and
making inferences in such environments rely on the assumption that only one equilibrium is
played in the data, this nding is relevant for the implementation of these techniques.
With discrete covariates, such inference is implementable using well-known results
in multiple testing. When a continuous covariate is included, the testing procedure should
account for the boundaries between regions with a dierent number of equilibria. We leave
this for future research. Another interesting direction for future research is the inference of
interaction eects if strategic dependence exists between games observed in data.
Finally, the conditional independence assumption is also found in dynamic games of
incomplete information. In those settings, optimal decision rules involve not only equilibrium
beliefs but continuation value functions that may change across equilibria. Though a detailed
analysis is deferred to future research, we speculate that our results generalize to such games
under certain additional assumptions. In particular, the characterization of optimal policy
rules in that context suggests that the existence of a unique equilibrium in the data can still
be detected by the lack of correlation in actions across players of a given game as presented
in the current paper.18
18With two actions, the optimal policy for a specic equilibrium would prescribe a decision rule like
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Appendix A: Additional Results
Proof of non-identication of the full structure
Because the data only provide information on the mixtures of equilibria, there are limits
to what can be learned about the structure from the data without additional assumptions.
This point is illustrated in the appendix using results from the literature on identiability
(or lack thereof) in mixture models.
Let  denote the structure (ui;i)N
i=1 and FjX, and let Lx; denote the choice proba-
bilities proles corresponding to BNE for a given x and parameter . That is, Lx;  fp 2
[0;1]N : p solves (1) for  and the given xg. We let x; be an equilibrium selection mech-
anism. The following proposition illustrates the limits of what can be learned about the
structure from the mixture data without imposing additional assumptions. Let #A denote
the cardinality of set A and dene h : [0;1]N  ! [0;1]N as
h(p(x);x;) 
 














43Then the structure is not identied if #Lx; > 2N 2
N .
Proof. We rst show that, for given x, the number of equilibria is nite. An equilibrium
vector p(x) is a xed point to the mapping depicted on display (1). Equivalently, we represent
it as a solution to the following equation:
h(p(x);x;) = 0:
Notice that f0;1g \ Fijx(R) = ; for any i, given the full support of i. Consequently, for a







the Implicit Function Theorem directly implies that the set of xed points to (13) is discrete
(i.e. its elements are isolated points: each element is contained in a neighborhood with
no other solutions to the system). Innitesimal changes in p(x) will imply a displacement
of h(;x;) from zero, so local perturbations in p(x) cannot be solutions to the system of
equations. Since p(x) 2 [0;1]N, the set of solutions is a bounded subset of RN. In RN, every
bounded innite subset has a limit point (i.e., an element for which every neighborhood
contains another element in the set) (Theorem 2.42 in Rudin (1976)). Consequently, a
discrete set, having no limit points, cannot be both bounded and innite. Being bounded
and discrete, the set of solutions is nite.
In this case, the observed joint distribution of equilibrium actions is a nite mixture.










For a given x, the problem of retrieving this cdf and mixing probabilities from observed data
is analyzed by Hall, Neeman, Pakyari, and Elmore (2005). In that paper, the authors show
that the choice and mixing probabilities (pl
i(x) and x;) cannot be obtained from observa-
tion of (y1;:::;yN;x;) if #Lx; > 2N 2
N . Consequently, it is necessary for identiability
44of the relevant probabilities that #Lx;  2N 2
N . Finally, if the equilibrium-specic choice
probabilities cannot be identied, the utility function and the distribution of private com-
ponents cannot be identied either (or else one could obtain the equilibrium specic choice
probabilities and use those to obtain the mixing distribution from the data).





6= 0 is likely to be satised. With two players,
for example, this determinant equals
1   1(x)2(x)f1jX(u1(x) + 1(x)p2(x))f2jX(u2(x) + 2(x)p1(x)):
Also when there are two players, the bound on the number of equilibria implies that, without
further assumptions, the existence of more than one equilibrium precludes identication.
Appendix B: A Wald Test for Multiple BNE




0) as G ! 1
where   (i)N
i=1. The Jacobian V is a N-by- ~ N matrix, with its i-th row Vi dened by
the following table (where (m);Vi;(m) denote the m-th coordinates of two ~ N-vectors  and
Vi respectively, and j;k 6= i),




















Let ^ ; ^ V be estimates for ;V respectively, constructed by replacing 0;I with non-
parametric estimates
^ 0 = G
 1g1(Xg = x) ; ^ I = G
 1g [iDi;g1(Xg = x)]
45Proposition B1 Suppose the data have G independent games with the same underlying
structure and both V and  are full-rank. Then
G(TG )






df=N as G ! 1:
Under the null,  = 0N and the chi-squared distribution can be used to obtain
critical values for the test statistic GT0
G(^ V^ ^ V
0
)
 1TG. Because N  3 and conditional
choice probabilities are bounded away from 0 and 1 (due to the rich support condition in
Assumption 1), the full-rank conditions above are not restrictive.
Appendix C: Algorithms for Stepwise Procedure
The following algorithm summarizes the stepwise multiple testing procedure we adopt from
Romano and Wolf (2005).
Algorithm C.1 (Basic Non-studentized Step-down Procedure)
Step 1. Relabel the hypotheses in descending order of the test statistics TG;i. Let H0
ik denote
the individual null hypothesis whose test statistic is the k-th largest.
Step 2. Set k = 1 and R1 = 0.
Step 3. For Rk + 1  s  N, if TG;(s)   ^ ck > 0, then reject the individual null H0
is.
Step 4. If no (further) null hypotheses are rejected, then stop. Otherwise, let Rk+1 denote
the total number of hypotheses rejected so far (i.e. Rk plus the number of hypotheses rejected
in the k-th step), and set k = k + 1. Then return to Step 3 above.
We consider two alternatives methodologies for the computation of ^ ck: bootstrap
and using the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. The two are summarized in the
following two algorithms.
Algorithm C.2 (Computing ^ ck Using Bootstrap)
Step 1. Let ik and Rk be dened as in Algorithm 1 above.
46Step 2. Generate B bootstrap data sets.














Step 5. Then compute ^ ck as the (1   )-th empirical quantile of the B values fmax
;b
G;kgbB.
Algorithm C.3 (Computing ^ ck Using Parametric Simulations)
Step 1. Estimate the covariance matrix of the vector of test statistics that corresponds to hy-
potheses which are not rejected after the rst k 1 steps, i.e. (TG;(Rk+1);TG;(Rk+2);:::;TG;(N)).
Denote the estimate by ^ k.
Step 2. Simulate a data set of M observations fvmgM
m=1 from the (N  Rk)-dimensional mul-
tivariate normal distribution with parameters (0N Rk; ^ k), where 0k is a k-vector of zeros.
Step 3. Then ^ ck is computed as the (1 )-th empirical quantile of the maximum coordinates
of vm in the simulated data. (M can be large relative to the number of bootstrap samples B
in Algorithm A.2 above.)
The studentized stepwise procedure is summarized in the following algorithm. As
before, Rk denotes the total number of hypotheses not rejected in the rst k   1 steps.
Algorithm C.4 (Studentized Step-down Procedure)
Step 1. Relabel the individual hypotheses in descending order of studentized test statistics
ZG;i  TG;i=^ G;i, where ^ G;i are estimates for standard deviation of TG;i.
Step 2. Set k = 1 and R1 = 0.
Step 3. For Rk + 1  s  S, if ZG;is > ^ dj, then reject the individual null H0
is.
Step 4. If no further individual null hypotheses are rejected, stop. Otherwise, let Rk+1 denote
the total number of hypotheses rejected so far and set k = k+1. Then return to Step 3 above.
The critical values for the studentized stepwise method ^ dk are computed by an algo-








are also computed in




G;is   TG;is)=^ 
;b
G;is in Step 4.
47Table 1: Finite Sample Performance: Tests for Multiple Equilibria
(Target probability for FWE:  = 0:10)
B = 1000 B = 2000
G  RP1 RP2 RP3 RP1 RP2 RP3
1000 0:50 0:101 0:101 0:095 0:112 0:109 0:111
0:25 0:093 0:094 0:085 0:094 0:096 0:089
0:10 0:107 0:107 0:102 0:114 0:119 0:112
3000 0:50 0:108 0:109 0:105 0:087 0:089 0:083
0:25 0:096 0:097 0:094 0:102 0:105 0:103
0:10 0:093 0:090 0:092 0:111 0:107 0:108
NOTE: Design 1: Number of simulations S = 1000. G is the sample
size.  species the probability that the rst equilibrium in Example
1 is chosen. RP1, 2 and 3 are rejection frequencies of the true null
following three tests respectively: (1) the non-studentized test with
^ ck from parametric simulations; (2) the non-studentized test with ^ ck
computed via bootstrap; and (3) the studentized test with ^ dk
computed via bootstrap.
Table 2: Finite Sample Performance: Test of Signs of Interaction Eects
Brackets include [q+;q ].
G  i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
1000 0:50 [0.036, 0.076] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:25 [0.035, 0.072] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:10 [0.040, 0.072] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
3000 0:50 [0.054, 0.067] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:25 [0.048, 0.048] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
0:10 [0.049, 0.053] [0.000,1.000] [0.000,1.000]
NOTE: Design 1: S is 1000. G is the sample size.  is the rst
equilibrium selection probability. q+ is the frequency of rejection of
H0 in favor of H+. q  is the frequency of rejection of H0 in favor
of H .
48Table 3: Propensity Scores in Bayesian Nash Equilibria
(p1;p2;p3 in brackets)
x1 x2 x3  = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1
 1  1=2  1 [0:3233;0:5603;0:3233] [0:3060;0:5561;0:3060] [0:2895;0:5526;0:2895]
 1  1=2 3 [0:2523;0:5288;0:7098] [0:2223;0:5196;0:7144] [0:1927;0:5111;0:7183]
 1 3=2  1 [0:2998;0:7012;0:2998] [0:2790;0:7033;0:2790] [0:2590;0:7048;0:2590]
 1 3=2 3 [0:2101;0:7262;0:7231] [0:1710;0:7323;0:7300] [0:1316;0:7376;0:7360]
2  1=2  1 [0:7124;0:5286;0:2518] [0:7167;0:5194;0:2219] [0:7203;0:5109;0:1922]
2  1=2 3 [0:7479;0:4754;0:7477] [0:7593;0:4541;0:7599] [0:7704;0:4322;0:7717]
2 3=2  1 [0:7249;0:7263;0:2098] [0:7313;0:7324;0:1707] [0:7369;0:7376;0:1314]
2 3=2 3 [0:7738;0:7724;0:7754] [0:7927;0:7903;0:7955] [0:8126;0:8090;0:8166]
Table 4: Finite Sample Performance: Test of Signs of Interaction Eects
(No. of simulations: S = 1000. Brackets include [q+;q ].)
G = 5000 G = 10000
 = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1:0  = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1:0
X1 =  1 [0:000;0:469] [0:001;0:628] [0:000;0:854] [0:000;0:717] [0:000;0:890] [0:000;0:986]
X2 =  1=2 [0:003;0:359] [0:000;0:520] [0:000;0:714] [0:000;0:577] [0:000;0:790] [0:000;0:925]
X3 =  1 [0:000;0:483] [0:000;0:643] [0:000;0:834] [0:000;0:702] [0:000;0:888] [0:000;0:986]
X1 = 2 [0:323;0:004] [0:459;0:000] [0:667;0:000] [0:484;0:000] [0:736;0:000] [0:910;0:000]
X2 = 3=2 [0:400;0:000] [0:617;0:000] [0:817;0:000] [0:665;0:000] [0:867;0:000] [0:979;0:000]
X3 = 3 [0:300;0:004] [0:496;0:000] [0:735;0:000] [0:545;0:000] [0:764;0:000] [0:930;0:000]
NOTE: q+ is the frequency of rejection of H0 in favor of H+. q  is the frequency of rejection of H0 in favor of H .
49Table 5: Di = 1(: 55)
Rel. Freq. Abs. Freq.
1 27.79% 56,653
0 72.21% 21,803
% and number of players choosing :55
or not. Di is an indicator of whether a
commercial is played at :55min.
Table 6: Multiplicity Tests (X=Hour of Day)
:55min vs not :55min G








Noon-1pm Wald Test 3:86 6;534
RW (2005) T3 > T2 > T1 > 0
















9-10pm Wald Test 4:23 6;520
RW (2005) T1 > T3 > T2 > 0
G is the number of games.
: Wald test statistic is signicant at 5%.
y: Signicant hypothesis at 5% FWER using Romano and Wolf (2005).
Tk is the individual test statistic for player (hypothesis) k. The number
of bootstrap repetitions is 1000.
50Table 7: Permutation Wald Tests (X=Hour of Day)
:55min vs not :55min G





G is the number of games. Permutations match
player 1 in day d to player 2 in day d   1 and player
3 in day d   2. This accounts for the reduction in
sample size.
: Wald test statistic is signicant at 5%.
Table 8: :55min vs. not :55min (X=Hour of Day, Market Size)
Market Size Hour of Day
(tercile) 12-1pm 4-5pm 5-6pm 9-10pm
1 Wald Test 0:77 4:94 3:22 2:27
RW (2005) T3 > T2 > 0 > T1 T2 > T1 > T3 > 0 T2 > T1 > T3 > 0 T1 > T3 > T2 > 0
G 2;201 2;201 2;200 2;199
2 Wald Test 0:73 3:87 1:97 2:48
RW (2005) T2 > T3 > 0 > T1 T3 > 0 > T1 > T2 T2 > T1 > T3 > 0 T2 > T1 > T3 > 0
G 2;157 2;220 2;159 2;153
3 Wald Test 4:96 19:06 26:07 2:92












2 > 0 T1 > T3 > 0 > T2
G 2;176 2;141 2;177 2;168
: Wald test statistic is signicant at 5%.
y: Signicant hypothesis at 5% FWER using Romano and Wolf (2005). Tk is the individual test
statistic for player (hypothesis) k. The number of bootstrap repetitions is 1000.
51